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CONCEPTION OF MONETARY POLICY INSTITUTIONAL  
STRUCTURE REFORMING IN THE REPUBLIC OF BELARUS 
 
It is shown in the paper that under current institutional conditions in the Republic of Belarus necessary 
for the real economy stimulating economic policy turns to be impossible. The main reason for such 
situation is the underdevelopment of the financial market adsorbing excess liquidity. It is also shown that 
in the countries with special dominance of the banking segment in the structure of financial system it is 
almost impossible to create a solid basis for long–term investing. At the same time, legal conditions for 
capital market and business development exist in the Republic of Belarus. The main obstacle in the 
development of the privatization processes considered by the author is the crisis of vertical and 
horizontal trust, which manifests itself in the well–known in the economic theory paradox of voting while 
making investment decisions. The creation of a new macro–economic structure – the Investment Bank of 
the first tier with the original scheme of attraction and placement of funds, which will allow to overcome 
the paradox of voting while making investment decisions and, therefore, will initiate the development of 
large–scale circulation of capital assets in the Republic of Belarus was suggested in the paper. 
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Introduction: Under the current conditions 
in Belarus neither expansionary nor restrictive 
policy can lead to success: expansionary mone-
tary policy leads to ersatz inflation, and the re-
strictive monetary policy, which is recommend-
ed by mainstream economy experts, may cause 
long–term depression. It is necessary to find the 
solution how to make it possible to create full–
fledged, either expansionary or restrictive mone-
tary policy taking into account conditions in the 
Republic of Belarus. 
In developed countries monetary system is 
rooted in the circulation of big capital. Under 
these conditions restrictive monetary policy 
leads to the strengthening of confidence to the 
national currency, capital cost reduction and in-
vestment opportunity improvement for this 
country, and the same capital market provides 
such situation when “cheap money”, associated 
with expansionary monetary policy, does not 
create excessive pressure on the consumer mar-
ket.  
The situation is a bit different in the countries 
with emerging markets. In these countries, as a 
rule, there is no developed capital market. Full–
fledged big capital market will make full–
fledged monetary policy possible and full–
fledged monetary policy in its turn will provide 
flexible floating exchange rate without the ne-
cessity to accumulate expensive foreign re-
serves. To create such a market it is necessary to 
conduct a full–scale privatization in Belarus. 
However, privatization should be carried out not 
in the frame of the budget process, but in the 
frame of full–fledged market formation strategy. 
In other words, privatization should be carried 
out in an adequate money form to ensure effi-
cient market functioning. 
Results and their discussion: Main financial 
depth indicators show the insufficient develop-
ment of capital market in the Republic of Bela-
rus. Main depth indicators (the ratio of domestic 
bank credit to GDP, the ratio of stock market 
capitalization to GDP, monetization ratio) are 
significantly lower not only than the level of 
developed countries but also the level of coun-
tries with emerging markets. Non–bank financial 
intermediation is almost not developed. Perma-
nent attempts to create a capital market, as a 
rule, are taken by the state power. There are al-
most no attempts coming from business envi-
ronment and population. 
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The liquidity of the secondary securities 
market remains low. The share of stock transac-
tions in the total volume of securities trading on 
the secondary market accounted only for 0.6% at 
the end of 2015. 
Entrepreneurial activity of the population, es-
timated by the level of small and medium–sized 
business development remains low as well. The 
share of small and medium–sized business in the 
main macroeconomic indicators is extremely 
small. According to the data of the year 2014 the 
share of small and medium–sized enterprises in 
GDP accounted for 25.3%, having increased by 
6.5 percentage points from 2009. The share of 
small and medium–sized enterprises in the aver-
age number of organization employees has in-
creased by 4.4 percentage points to 32.5% from 
the year 2009. At the same time the main share 
of SMEs (50.8%) accounts for trade, car and 
home appliance repair service [1]. At the same 
time in the European Union SMEs form the ba-
sis of the European economy, accounting for 
about 95% of the total number of enterprises. 
They have the highest innovation responsivity 
and interest in carrying out R&D. In the USA 
SMEs account for over 50% of the economy. 
Investment activity of the Belarusian popula-
tion, as in most countries with transition econo-
my, is mainly concentrated in the banking sec-
tor. Investments in securities constitute a small 
proportion of financial assets of households. 
Such a structure of the investment activity of 
the population is determined largely by the fact 
that Belarus is bank–based country as most 
countries with emerging markets. Nevertheless, 
in the Eurozone countries, where the financial 
systems are traditionally bank–based, the in-
vestment activity of the population in relation to 
non–banking sector is quite high. Investments in 
shares and stocks in the structure of financial 
assets of households account for 21.6%, while 
the investing share in investment funds accounts 
for nearly 7% of total financial assets holdings. 
Other investments in long–term securities ac-
count for 6.7%. In the USA, which has the fi-
nancial system focused on security market and 
institutional investors, the participation degree 
of households in investment activity is even 
higher. 
In the countries with exceptional dominance 
of the banking sector there may be a lack of re-
sources for long–term investment, because the 
prevalence of short–term liabilities in the struc-
ture of liabilities is one of the traditional features 
of the bank balance sheet. In the countries with 
emerging markets this feature becomes more 
vivid. So, in 2015 the share of deposits in Bela-
rusian rubles for a period of over three years 
amounted only to 0.1 of the total amount of new 
deposits in national currency in the structure of 
deposits of the Belarusian banks (Table 1). Such 
situation happens due to the low level of hori-
zontal and vertical trust in the country. Under 
such conditions it is not possible to create a full–
fledged capital market only on the basis of the 
banking system. 
In recent years notable changes have hap-
pened in the structure of the financial sector all 
over the world. Non–banking institutional inves-
tors, particularly pension funds, insurance com-
panies, mutual funds have become increasingly  
 
 
Table 1 – Structure of bank deposits according to maturity, % 
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To 1 
year 
84,8 87,2 88,1 77,8 92,5 74,25 91,8 67,2 87 63,1 90,9 69,6 
From 1 
year to 
3 years 
11,8 12,4 7,4 21,6 6,1 25,2 7,9 32,2 12,5 35,7 9 28,9 
More 
than 3 
years 
3,4 0,4 4,5 0,6 1,4 0,55 0,25 0,6 0,5 1,2 0,1 1,5 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: compiled by the author according to the National Bank data [2] 
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important players on financial markets. Tak-
ing into account the low level of interest rates as 
a result of an extremely soft monetary policy in 
recent years and the volatility of stock markets, 
institutional investors are increasingly looking 
for new sources of long–term investments and 
investments in productive assets. For example 
infrastructure and other large projects are often 
considered as a worthy alternative to stock in-
vestments. Nevertheless, there are some barriers 
for long–term investing for non–banking finan-
cial intermediaries: the lack of proper financial 
instruments for an investor, the lack of risk 
guarantees; the lack of quality information about 
the projects; risk uncertainty and assessment 
difficulties typical for new projects, especially in 
the absence of regular market; the lack of 
knowledge of potential investors in the area of 
financial investments and technologies of vari-
ous projects may hinder the development of 
long–term investing as from the side of institu-
tional investor as from the mass investor side in 
any country. Similar long–term investing barri-
ers exist in the countries with emerging markets, 
particularly in Belarus. Here we can add the 
complexity of the share purchase procedure 
from the technical and time–consuming point of 
view. All these issues are aggravated by the ver-
tical and horizontal trust crisis caused by politi-
cal reasons. Adaptive expectations lie in the 
ground of this crisis, as well as actions of voting 
and election paradoxes. 
Adaptive expectations are based on the time 
extrapolation of the negative experience of high 
inflation and a series of devaluations. 
The effect of voting paradox appears on the 
realization stage of already originated entrepre-
neurial idea. However, the situation may be 
complicated by the fact that a certain kind of 
paradox arises at the stage of individual choice 
as well. In the strict definition of voting paradox 
individual choice is not internally contradictory, 
and the subject acts rationally. Nevertheless, the 
need to make a choice can make an individual 
passive and indecisive. We have defined this 
situation as the paradox of choice. A state of 
indecision is determined primarily by the fact 
that the selection of one option causes increasing 
imputed costs of refusal from other options. At 
the stage of business idea search a range of indi-
vidual’s possibilities increases by the accumula-
tion of knowledge and skills. At the stage of en-
trepreneurial idea choice a range of individual’s 
possibilities narrows sharply, limiting the scope 
to one alternative. 
In developed countries a wide range of op-
tions for individual and collective investing re-
duces imputed costs in decision–making by po-
tential investors greatly. Here the level of these 
costs is determined by the phase of the economic 
cycle. In times of boom the difference in risk 
premiums on various financial instruments is 
reduced, and hence the choice losses are mini-
mal. Vice versa, in times of crisis spreads are 
large and, therefore, imputed costs increase. 
In the countries with underdeveloped capital 
market and the inability to determine the fair 
value of assets and, consequently, interest rates 
on them, potential investors always face signifi-
cant imputed costs. Therefore, under sufficient 
institutional conditions there are not many of 
those who are willing to do business and invest 
in the real sector. When the market is unable to 
create the forms to overcome these paradoxes, 
they have to be created by the public sector, as it 
happens in Belarus. Thus, own crisis dialectic of 
capital market attributes it to the category of 
public goods, that is, goods that can’t be pro-
duced by the market. That is why the attempts to 
create various forms of collective and individual 
investing in Belarus are taken by the state pow-
er. And it means that even those goods that are 
produced by the market in developed countries 
fall in the category of public goods. This can be 
attributed to the specific reasons for the growth 
of public spending. 
To overcome the paradox of voting, we sug-
gest the establishment of a separate macrostruc-
ture, the Investment bank of the first tier (the 
Bank of Capital), with a specific fund raising 
scheme, presupposing gradual responsibility 
taking and associativity in decision–making 
from the part of potential investor. 
Recently, there have also been suggestions 
for the establishment of special macroeconomic 
institute, operating on a permanent basis, as the 
subject of unconventional monetary policy con-
duct among the western academics. Thus, in 
2013 in the article “Qualitative easing: the new 
tool for stabilization of financial markets” R. 
Farmer, analyzing unconventional expansionary 
policy conducted by the leading central banks, 
as opposed to quantitative easing, designating 
large–scale asset purchases by the central bank 
through the money issue, called the change in 
the asset composition of the central bank as 
“qualitative easing” [3, p. 406]. Farmer sees 
“qualitative easing” in the context of large fiscal 
policy and offers National Treasury to use it on a 
regular basis as a means of maintaining financial 
stability and reducing long–term unemployment. 
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For the financial markets to operate efficient R. 
Farmer suggests the establishment of a special 
institution, the fiscal authority with the compe-
tence to actively manage the maturity structure 
and risk asset composition. The institution 
should be created on the model of the central 
bank and have the power and instruments to sta-
bilize fluctuations of the stock market.  
The purpose of this institution should be reg-
ulating qualitative easing policy by means of 
long–term and short–term asset active trading 
for their price stabilization. Central banks, ac-
quiring long–term assets, as a rule, take on a 
significant risk. With the growth of interest rates 
in the future they may bear losses of value of the 
portfolio of securities held on their balance 
sheet. Establishment of the institution regulating 
financial markets, according to R. Farmer, will 
release central banks from these risks and unu-
sual fiscal functions. It is expected that this insti-
tution will be established to carry out open mar-
ket operations between risky and safe assets. In 
the subsequent to his article comments R. 
Farmer specified that efficient measures for the 
new institution would be not buying individual 
stocks but buying stock indices through funds. 
For the countries with emerging economies, 
in particular for the Republic of Belarus, the ne-
cessity of creating a separate macrostructure, the 
Investment bank of the first tier (the Bank of 
Capital) is determined, above all, by the necessi-
ty to include productive capital in the market 
turnover. 
Let us represent the main features of the legal 
status of the Investment bank of the first tier. 
Investment bank as the first–tier bank (the Bank 
of Capital) should have a special status of an 
official institution, without being a public au-
thority at the same time. Its authoritative power 
should become apparent only in the field of fi-
nancial market regulation. Relationships with 
potential investors, owners of investment depos-
its and incorporated enterprises should be built 
on a voluntary basis, should have the horizontal 
nature, should be legalized by bilateral agree-
ments and should be regulated by civil law. The 
Investment bank of the first tier as a legal entity 
of public law may be established on the basis of 
the law, decree or other legal act of the state 
power body in an administrative order. Its activi-
ties should be regulated by special regulatory 
legal acts and should not fall under the regula-
tion of banking legislation. And although, ac-
cording to the conception the Investment bank of 
the first tier should be created on the model of 
the classic central bank but should not replace it. 
On the contrary, it is supposed that the Invest-
ment bank shall contribute to the implementa-
tion of classic functions of the central bank, de-
signed to carry out discretionary monetary poli-
cy exclusively by traditional measures. The main 
goal of the Investment bank shall be the finan-
cial market formation and regulation. The pur-
pose of the Investment bank of the first tier (the 
Bank of Capital) designed to expand the mass 
circulation of financial capital is fixed in the pe-
culiarities of raising funds as well as in the anal-
ysis of investment projects, which should take 
into account the extent of readiness of potential 
investors to invest money for the sake of realiza-
tion of business ideas. 
Investment and deposit scheme of the Bank 
of Capital is as follows: a system of entrepre-
neurial ideas (investment projects) is suggested 
to potential investors. If a potential investor gets 
interested in a certain idea, he will be able to 
place his deposit in the Investment bank for this 
business project. Similarly, the projects of con-
struction savings, serving as collateral, were car-
ried out in the Republic of Belarus, in the Czech 
Republic and some other countries. However, in 
the Investment bank model the funds placed for 
this or that project, performing the collateral 
function, can also shift through the system of 
projects according to the changing priorities of 
potential investors thus preserving liquidity of 
financial investments and reducing the imputed 
costs. In the model suggested the possibility of a 
limited number of alternative business projects 
in respect to one investment subject can be built 
up. There should be not many alternative plans 
of the kind not to aggravate the problem of 
choice. 
Thus, the selection of a potential investor 
happens to be implicative: if other potential in-
vestors support his decision by their implicative 
investments, the project can be realized. 
The Investment bank (the Bank of Capital) 
implies the transformation of the investment 
savings of investors in shares or other forms of 
business project capital participation by the end 
of the savings phase. The implementation of this 
model will allow to specify the circulation of 
funds for business projects (investments) and 
thus to bind together additional money supply 
incoming into the circulation. Savings trans-
formed into real investment projects form the 
capital circulation. Implementation of invest-
ment projects actuates a multiplier effect of en-
trepreneurial ideas and business projects. Thus, 
the growth of money supply, created by the In-
vestment bank through the multiplicative growth 
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of investment deposits, will have non–
inflationary character. 
The Investment bank builds the “roadmap” of 
sectoral and technological structure of invest-
ments not only as a business plan, but as a spe-
cific deposit structure placed for specific pro-
jects. It ensures that when there is no place in the 
deposit structure, investors will be given a calcu-
lated economic benefit beforehand in the form of 
equity participation of the created enterprise. 
Another distinctive feature of the Investment 
bank model (the Bank of Capital) is provided by 
the widespread use of the foresight method. 
Foresight recalls an integrated forecast but 
comes from the fact that for the desired future 
scenario to take place it is necessary to take ade-
quate actions today, so the selection of options is 
accompanied by the development of measures 
ensuring the optimum path of innovative devel-
opment. Regular expert forecast assumes that the 
forecast itself does not affect the predictable 
events. When using the foresight method not 
only possible alternatives are being elaborated, 
but also the most preferred one is being selected. 
Decision taking on a specific investment project 
should be based on an integral vision of the 
economy. Taking a decision, expert assessments 
of a significant number of experts from different 
areas of the economy, engineering, technology 
and science are taken into account. Not only the 
views of other experts, but forming up and con-
stantly changing structure of investment depos-
its, economic, science and technology develop-
ment forecasts will influence the opinion of ex-
perts. Their tasks should be the identification of 
market niches, the choice of investment projects 
on the basis of perspective technologies that 
could produce a competitive product, develop-
ment of branches with a significant multiplier 
effect. The very organization of the “foresight” 
future development of the economic structure 
using a combination of a variety of methods 
(expert panels, Delphi, relevance trees, analysis 
of mutual influence, etc.) will lead to the for-
mation of a higher culture of research and for-
mation of a more sound economic policy. 
For the successful implementation of the 
suggested Investment bank model (the Bank of 
Capital) it is necessary to fulfill certain condi-
tions. First of all, the accumulation of funds in 
the case of the Investment bank shall be made 
public. Information on the amounts of invest-
ment deposits for each particular project should 
be available to all interested users in real–time 
operation mode, which is quite possible on the 
basis of modern means of communication, and 
should embrace the audience to the maximum. It 
may be the rent of the electronic platform of the 
National Center for Marketing and Price Study, 
the Belarusian Universal Commodity Exchange, 
Belarusian Currency and Stock Exchange, the 
creation of a banner on the website of the Na-
tional Bank, other business and administrative 
areas of the Internet resources that allow maxi-
mum coverage of corporate clients and foreign 
investors. To attract attention of individuals it is 
possible to use even the resource of social Inter-
net networks, and information opportunities of 
commercial banks, which could promote the 
idea of the Investment bank as deposit transac-
tions are being now advertised in the interests of 
individuals [4; 6]. Hence, it is possible to make 
rating of any project according to the number of 
investors who have placed a deposit, and the 
amount of deposits. Without this the idea of the 
Investment bank is losing its value. It is also im-
portant that all investment offers placed in the 
bank should be understandable to potential in-
vestors, including an individual who is not a 
specialist in the field of financial management. 
At the same time the information about the in-
vestment offers should be given to such an ex-
tent not to disappoint a strategic investor by the 
apparent simplicity and make it possible for him 
to carry out more in–depth financial analysis. 
Thus, the major problem is the information dis-
closure. In our opinion, information disclosure 
should be unified with the elements of specifici-
ty depending on industry, project scale and other 
characteristics. In any case, there must be a cer-
tain standardization, which should be known to 
potential suppliers of ideas. 
The order of information disclosure is im-
portant as well. At the initial stage it is worth-
while to provide its expertise even free of 
charge. In the future, with the Investment bank 
development the employees of the Investment 
bank (the Bank of Capital) could provide paid 
services on registration of ideas in the invest-
ment project acceptable for analysis and voting. 
The Investment bank in this context may con-
tribute to the development of small administra-
tive–territorial formations. The idea of sustaina-
ble development of regions is already framed in 
the Republic of Belarus as a state program. 
However, the initiative of its implementation 
comes from the top. Local authorities, economic 
entities and population are not aware of all real 
opportunities for local self–governance. At the 
same time sustainable development of regions 
throughout the world is the foundation for global 
stability. Without local initiative all the efforts 
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of central and local authorities will be ineffec-
tive. But with the help of the Investment bank 
mechanism the information barrier and distrust 
factor can be overcome: furthermore, the local 
authorities can also get an efficient mechanism 
for investment management. Thus, having public 
funds for small business support, local authori-
ties will not just “give them away” for specific 
requests and applications, but put on deposits in 
the Investment bank, voting for those projects 
that are necessary to develop in this particular 
region. Moreover, local authorities can play the 
role of investment project suppliers. Then it 
would be possible to make the use of banking 
resource more efficient: the bank (including au-
thorized state agent, such as the Development 
Bank) will evaluate future loan applications 
more confidently and minimize credit risks, if it 
sees how actively various categories of project 
depositors vote [4; 5]. 
The Investment bank can serve as the basis 
for regional innovative clusters and groups of 
clusters forming and provide them with the in-
flow of financial resources [6]. 
According to the conception, the Investment 
bank shall act not only on the primary stock 
market, but also on the secondary market. Guid-
ed by the macroeconomic needs of financial sta-
bility the Investment bank (the Bank of Capital) 
may use special instruments in the regulation of 
secondary market: displaying bilateral quota-
tions for securities of certain issuers and using 
the instrument of stock price valorization. In the 
latter case, the Investment bank (the Bank of 
Capital) targets and publicly announces targets 
for the increase in share prices of leading com-
panies for a certain period. Through these in-
struments the Investment bank (the Bank of 
Capital) forms an analogue of unconventional 
monetary policy, which is widely used in devel-
oped countries. Valorization of assets will allow 
ensuring an upward trend of shares which are 
already in circulation and protect the emerging 
stock market from possible speculative dumping 
of shares. (Under the depressive post–Soviet 
conditions such a scenario is probable on the 
emerging stock market and is considered to be a 
danger of disastrous profanation of its idea.) 
The main objective of the classic investment 
bank is gaining profit and regulating certain fi-
nancial market segments, while the main objec-
tive of the Investment bank of the first tier is the 
macroeconomic financial stability, what can be 
achieved with the help of the following instru-
ments: 1) a special deposit and investment 
scheme to raise funds of individuals and legal 
entities for investment projects; 2) the purchase 
of securities of certain companies as a guarantee 
of initial public offering (non–commercial un-
derwriting) taking the risk of underwriting; 3) 
purchase and sale of securities on the secondary 
market to enhance liquidity and stabilize asset 
prices; 4) valorization of shares of major com-
panies. Thus, the Investment bank of the first 
tier generates an effective way of transforming 
money into capital, savings into real investments 
through special capital specification instruments, 
i.e. the separation of capital and money circula-
tion. 
The macrostructure offered is quite suitable, 
in our opinion, for carrying out mass privatiza-
tion. We offer the following steps for carrying 
out privatization: First of all, activity direction 
of the Investment bank (the Bank of Capital) 
connected with the privatization of already exist-
ing property, is appropriate to formalize as a 
state program of mass privatization. This will 
give importance to this process and help organ-
ize its informational support, so necessary for 
the success of this project. 
It is necessary to define the stages of mass 
privatization, the time of the beginning and the 
end of each stage (tranche), the share of state 
property to be privatized in each tranche, the 
authorities responsible for carrying out privatiza-
tion in the program. It is also important to set 
minimum ownership stake in each tranche, sub-
ject to privatization by the public. Then it is nec-
essary to create a list of objects for privatization. 
The selection of companies should be entrusted 
to the State Property Committee. The list must 
be pre–announced with a broad informational 
support and explanation of all the details of the 
program to the public. With regard to enterprises 
to be privatized privatization plans should be 
elaborated. The plans should be elaborated on an 
alternative basis. The basic privatization project 
should be prepared by the enterprise itself. Any 
legal or physical person, including non–
residents, can offer its/his/her privatization plan. 
It is important to unify the projects, which will 
make their analysis to the users easier. It is ex-
pected that the privatization initiative may come 
not only from the state but also from the enter-
prises themselves, as well as potential investors. 
In this case, to ground the inclusion of enterpris-
es in the privatization lists, they must submit 
privatization projects. Privatization projects 
should include information on key indicators of 
enterprise activities, its balance sheet and as-
sessed value. To obtain the information neces-
sary to compile the privatization plan of any en-
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terprise the outsiders can apply for the Invest-
ment bank, where the information on each of the 
privatized enterprises should be concentrated. 
The final decision on the selection of the privati-
zation plan must be taken by a state commission 
with the participation of the Investment bank 
experts. After selecting the final version of the 
privatization project by the commission it is 
necessary to set a certain time period for poten-
tial investors to get to know with privatization 
plans of the enterprises included in the updated 
lists. After this period and the announcement of 
the tranche beginning the deposition of funds in 
investment deposits for the privatized objects 
may be allowed. Each tranche can be divided 
into rounds. The number of rounds in each 
tranche may be different. The final date for the 
savings stage and the beginning of the invest-
ment stage should be clearly defined. The In-
vestment bank (the Bank of Capital) should 
serve as a temporary nominal shareholder from 
the beginning of the savings stage to the transfer 
of shares into the property of the investor. It 
must hold the shares of privatized companies till 
their full realization. It is expected that the In-
vestment bank will have the right to purchase 
shares in the absence of demand for shares of 
any enterprise. It also can be a buyer or an in-
termediary in the sale of shares of privatized 
enterprises. An important element of the model 
is to determine the initial share price. We believe 
it is possible to use the experience of the Czech 
Republic in organizing privatization auctions in 
1991–1993. Initial share price during the first 
round should be the same. The number of shares 
of enterprises should be based on the assessed 
value and value per share. At the end of the sav-
ings stage the compliance of the amount of de-
posited investments with value of shares of the 
privatized enterprises is defined. Here the fol-
lowing situations may arise. If the amount of 
deposited investments is less than share price of 
the enterprise, the investor’s submitted applica-
tions are met based on the amount of each in-
vestment, and the remaining shares are trans-
ferred to the next round, where they are sold 
based on the amount of investment deposits 
placed for the privatization project. When the 
amount of deposits corresponds to share price, 
orders are satisfied in the proportion to the stake 
of each investment. If the total value of placed 
deposits exceeds share price, the actions may be 
different depending on the amount of excess. In 
the situation with a slight excess priority should 
be given to individuals through a decline in the 
stake of legal entities. In the situation with sig-
nificant excess shares shall be transferred to the 
second round, where they should be sold at a 
price determined by the amount of the invest-
ment deposits invested in this privatization pro-
ject. 
The benefits of the model suggested are as 
follows: 
– Gaining access to financing for the state–
owned enterprises; 
– Greater opportunities for enterprises to get 
strategic investors; 
– High rate of the capital market formation; 
– Paid nature of privatization, what contrib-
utes to the efficient owner emergence; 
– Investment deposit investors are direct 
buyers of shares of privatized companies, and 
hence they will identify themselves with them 
(in the Czech version of privatization the majori-
ty of the privatization subjects entrusted this 
function to investment funds). 
The Investment bank of the first tier is de-
signed to give the productive capital, distributed 
across different sectors, a unified liquid form, 
and, thus, affect the aggregate money supply. 
Similarly, residential real estate in developed 
countries became a liquid asset with the help of 
mortgage assets securitization technique. With 
the help of various types of instruments of trans-
ferring assets to liquid form, forming mortgage 
pools, housing, inherently having good conserv-
ability, became homogeneous product as well. 
Significant amounts of savings accumulated in 
the mortgage programs were bound together and 
provided with housing. The upward trend on the 
housing market provided spontaneous valoriza-
tion of issued securities backed by mortgages. 
The secondary market of these securities became 
gigantic in size. Sustainable price rise for the 
real estate worldwide for a long period of time 
shaped the confidence of investors and long–
term plan for the business environment. Mone-
tary funds, saved for buying a house or paying 
interest on construction loans and mortgages, 
which are already secured by existing institu-
tions and macroeconomic relationships, obtained 
additional collateral by unfinished housing. As a 
result, monetary authorities acquired a right for a 
certain share premium, approximately equal to 
the sum of saved monetary funds, secured by the 
acquired liquid commodity (asset). However, 
this right was taken the advantage of not by 
monetary authorities but large institutional in-
vestors through a liberal credit policy and specu-
lative transactions on the financial market, what 
caused the crisis. 
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The entire system of savings accumulated in 
the Bank of Capital is nothing less than money 
supply specification policy, which provides 
capital circulation as it is not enough simply to 
increase the money supply in the country in or-
der to bring the coefficient value of monetization 
of the Belarusian economy to the high values of 
the developed countries. In the situation of cur-
rent economic macrostructure the smallest in-
crease in money supply in the national economy 
is rapidly triggering galloping inflation. For-
mation of the savings system secured by capital 
circulation – and this is the specification of the 
money supply – will allow determining the re-
quired secure increase of the national economy 
coefficient monetization, overcoming existing in 
Belarusian economy institutional traps [7]. 
Thus, the aim of economic crisis overcoming 
and stimulating economic development is speci-
fied in the fact that increasing the liquidity vol-
ume in the economy in strict correlation with the 
increase in investment demand, it is necessary to 
form a transparent space of a long–term invest-
ment plan and to increase the degree of prefer-
ence for capital goods by the indicative plan-
ning. 
It is important to ensure a potential investor 
in the fact that the capital goods in one of the 
valorization modes will rise in price, as he had 
been convinced in the upward trend eternity on 
the housing market for quite a long time. 
Conclusion: The main macro–economic im-
portance of the Bank of Capital is to give li-
quidity to capital facilities. Capital facilities be-
ing in quiescent condition have low liquidity. 
Being involved into the market turnover, they 
acquire market price and liquidity. 
 
 
Table 2 – Matrix of interaction between macroeconomic institutions 
 
 
Central bank Central government 
Investment bank of the 
first tier (the Bank of 
Capital) 
Central bank 
 
Traditional monetary 
policy mainly by means 
of the interest rate chan-
nel. The main goal – 
price stability 
Financial agent of the 
government 
 
 
Provides the framework 
for setting interest rates 
on active and passive 
operations of the Bank 
of Capital by means of 
interest rate policy 
Central government 
Interaction in the elabo-
ration and implementa-
tion of monetary policy 
Fiscal policy 
 
Participation in the 
elaboration of the state 
privatization program. 
Information support of 
privatization and in-
vestment projects 
Investment bank of the 
first tier (the Bank of 
Capital) 
 
It releases the central 
bank from the risks as-
sociated with the neces-
sity to conduct uncon-
ventional monetary pol-
icy. Provision of finan-
cial capital turnover by 
productive capital turn-
over allows increasing 
paid–in capital and 
economy monetization. 
It forms and develops 
basic institutes of mone-
tary policy. Provides 
money market rates de-
crease 
Сosts reduction con-
nected with control and 
management efficiency 
increase of privatized 
enterprises. The in-
crease in the possibility 
of finding a strategic 
investor for the enter-
prises to be privatized. 
Budget revenues from 
privatization 
Financial market for-
mation and regulation 
(assets price regulation). 
Investment deposit 
opening to potential in-
vestors. Intermediation 
in the privatization and 
corporatization of in-
vestment projects. Nom-
inal shareholder of pri-
vatized enterprises 
Compiled by the author 
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The suggested procedure for the formation of 
prices on them, as well as the suggested system 
to reduce risks, allow giving intrinsic value of 
liquid assets to capital facilities whereas in the 
frame of current paradigm, they are considered 
only as a means of creating new value (GDP). 
This will allow the National Bank of the Repub-
lic of Belarus to use efficient mechanisms of 
monetary policy, widely used by central banks 
in developed countries. 
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О.А. ХМЕЛЬ  
  
КОНЦЕПЦИЯ РЕФОРМИРОВАНИЯ ИНСТИТУЦИОНАЛЬНОЙ 
СТРУКТУРЫ МОНЕТАРНОЙ ПОЛИТИКИ В РЕСПУБЛИКЕ  
БЕЛАРУСЬ 
 
В статье показано, что в существующих в Республике Беларусь институциональных условиях 
так необходимая реальной экономике стимулирующая экономическая политика оказывается не-
возможной. Основной причиной такого положения вещей является неразвитость финансового 
рынка, адсорбирующего избыточную ликвидность. Показано также, что в странах с сугубым 
доминированием в структуре финансовой системы банковского сегмента практически невоз-
можно создать прочную базу для долгосрочного инвестирования. В то же время правовые усло-
вия для развития рынка капитала и предпринимательства в Республике Беларусь существуют. 
Главным препятствием в развитии приватизационных процессов и финансового рынка авторы 
считают кризис вертикального и горизонтального доверия, проявляющийся в хорошо известном в 
экономической теории парадоксе голосования при принятии инвестиционных решений. В статье 
предложено создание нового макроэкономического института – Инвестиционного банка первого 
уровня, с оригинальной схемой привлечения и размещения денежных средств, которая позволит 
преодолеть парадокс голосования при принятии инвестиционных решений и, следовательно, по-
ложит начало развитию широкомасштабного оборота капитальных средств в Республике Бела-
русь.  
 
Ключевые слова: финансовый рынок, денежно–кредитная политика, финансовая глубина, пара-
докс голосования, приватизация, инвестиции, Инвестиционный банк первого уровня, инновацион-
ные кластеры 
English version was prepared by Khmel O.A. 
© Золотарева О.А., Хмель О.А 
Статья поступила 29 сентября 2016г. 
  
По
ес
ГУ
